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Abstract 
Counterfeit electronic components (CEC) are of great concern to governments and industry globally as they could lead to systems and mission 
failure, malfunctioning of safety critical systems, and reduced reliability of high-hazard assets. Depending on the cost of CEC going into the 
production line, some industries might look to have some sort of inspection capability in-house to screen critical components before they go 
to assembly. Although advanced counterfeit inspection methods have been developed for a variety of components, they generally exhibit a 
combination of disadvantages such as destructive, low throughput, high unit cost, or inaccessible to unskilled operator. This paper investigates 
the potential of pulsed thermography on detection of CEC in a fast and non-destructive manner. The second derivative of post-heat thermal 
response is used to construct a fingerprint to differentiate genuine and counterfeit components. Results successfully demonstrate the potential 
of the proposed solution. 
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1. Introduction 
Here Counterfeit electronic components (CEC), hidden 
trouble in electronic supply chain, are of great concern to 
governments, industries and defenses globally. They could 
cause catastrophic consequence or failure to critical in-
services system due to its low-quality, low-efficiency or 
unreliability [1, 2]. Typical malfunctions of CECs such as 
overheating or short circuits, leading to fires, shocks or 
explosions that can result in serious injury and property crash 
in manufacturing, transporting and aviation. CECs also pose 
severe threats to cybersecurity, which has been identified as 
one of the most serious economic and national security 
challenges of the 21st century [3]. The legitimate electronic 
industries miss out on about $100 billion of global revenue 
every year because of counterfeiting, which is just one part of 
economic benefit in the murky CEC market [4]. Some 
stakeholders apply a variety of inspection methods to screen 
for counterfeits, but are limited by a combination of 
disadvantages [5]. For example; random spot checks are often 
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. I tr cti  
ere terfeit electr ic c e ts ( ), i e  
tr le i  electr ic s l  c ai , are f reat c cer  t  
er e ts, i stries a  efe ses l all . e  c l  
ca se catastr ic c se e ce r fail re t  critical i -
ser ices s ste  e t  its l - alit , l -efficie c  r 
relia ilit  [ , ]. ical alf cti s f s s c  as 
er eati  r s rt circ its, lea i  t  fires, s c s r 
e l si s t at ca  res lt i  seri s i j r  a  r ert  cras  
i  a fact ri , tra s rti  a  a iati . s als  se 
se ere t reats t  c ersec rit , ic  as ee  i e tifie  as 
e f t e st seri s ec ic a  ati al sec rit  
c alle es f t e st ce t r  [ ]. e le iti ate electr ic 
i stries iss t  a t  illi  f l al re e e 
e er  ear eca se f c terfeiti , ic  is j st e art f 
ec ic e efit i  t e r   ar et [ ]. e 
sta e l ers a l  a ariet  f i s ecti  et s t  scree  
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time-consuming and can miss detections between inspections 
[6]. Other techniques, similarly, cannot be widely used due to 
features of destructive, low throughput, high unit-cost or 
over-sophisticated for unskilled operator [7]. Therefore, an 
intuitive, non-contact, high-efficient and low-cost non-
destructive inspection technique is urgently demanded to 
reduce threaten of CECs. 
Non-destructive testing (NDT) techniques have been 
widely used and play an important role in structure 
maintenance, degradation-assessment and though-life 
engineering [8-10]. Ranging from visual, eddy current, 
ultrasonic, magnetic particle, radiography to 3D tomography, 
thermography, multiple NDT methods show great 
applicability and competence in manufacturing, aviation, 
military and nuclear power industry. Among diversity of 
inspection methods, infrared thermography (IRT) is a 
powerful and promising technique due to the features of 
rapid, robust, non-contact inspection and intuitive images. 
IRT can be divided into two modes: active and passive. In 
order to rapidly identify counterfeit parts in batches, active 
thermography, which induce a heat flow into objects to 
generate thermal contrast and to highlight anomalies and 
defect, is more competent. Active thermography varies into 
different forms according to diversity of heat source including 
flash [11], laser [12], eddy current [13] and ultrasonic 
vibration. While the heating application differs between 
pulse, lock-in and modulated patterns, according the 
inspection requirement. The aims of this research is to 
develop a rapid, robust and non-destructive inspection 
technique for CECs. A high-energy pulse flash is applied to 
perform the pulse thermography test for electronic 
components. 
In infrared thermography, thermal image processing 
methods are crucial to post-inspection process dealing with 
characteristic signal extraction, defect quantification to image 
quality improvement; for instance, the pulse phase 
thermography (PPT) algorithm [14] was one such method 
based on the phase signal of response of the thermal wave in 
inspected objects. But its capability is commonly limited in 
those cases whose initial decline frames is heavily impacted 
by noises. The Thermographic Signal Reconstruction (TSR) 
[15] method was a milestone algorithm which remarkably 
improved the spatial and temporal resolution of the 
thermogram sequence and consequently promoted the 
anomaly detectability. By focusing on thermal sequence 
reconstruction and alleviating the transient noise 
simultaneously, TSR-based analysis and corresponding 
developments have been applied on quantification of different 
defect information and transformation of the thermography 
data into RGB images [16, 17]. In addition, its theory has been 
extended to use with other algorithms, like Principal 
Component Thermography (PCT) [18]. The elegance of the 
TSR method has been demonstrated to be powerful at 
extracting subtle features in thermography data, which make 
it attractive for use in inspection of electronic components. 
The paper describes the experiment setup and TSR method 
used, detailing application of the TSR “fingerprint” method, 
followed by investigation of signature variation from 
experimental parameters, and between similar and different 
components, establishing a ‘base-line’ for minimum and 
maximum correlation, which is then compared with a real 
counterfeit example component. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Experiment setup 
In pulsed thermography, the experimental setup 
encompasses a short and high energy light pulse is projected 
onto the sample surface via flash lamps, shown in Fig. 1(a). 
Heat then conducts from the surface to the interior of the 
sample, leading to a continuous decrease of the surface 
temperature [1] (see Fig. 1(b)). An infrared camera captures 
the time-dependent response of the surface temperature. The 
time of cooling interruption can be used to estimate thickness 
(if thermal diffusivity is known) or diffusivity (if the 
thickness is known) of the sample material.  
The experiments were conducted using the 
Thermoscope® II pulsed-active thermography system that 
comprises of two capacitor banks powered Xenon flash 
lamps mounted in an internally reflective hood and a desktop 
PC to capture and store data. A FLIR SC7000 series infrared 
(IR) radiometer operating between 3-5.1 µm and a spatial 
resolution of 640×512 pixels was used to perform the 
inspection. The samples were placed with their surface 
perpendicular to the IR camera’s line of sight at 250 mm from 
the lens. The flash energy applied was ~ 2 kJ over an 
inspection area of 250 mm × 200 mm. The pixel pitch is 0.32 
mm. 
Fig2. (a) shows a snapshot of the test board that includes 
various types electronic components. A raw temperature 
thermogram of the test board inspected from the top side from 
the first frame after flash is shown in Fig. 2(b).  
2.2 Estimation of thermal fingerprint 
 
Fig. 1: (a) Experimental configuration of the pulsed thermographic 
inspection, where point 1 denotes a position on the sample surface 
with a reduced thickness and point 2 denotes a position representing 
the through-thickness; (b) Typical observed time-temperature decay 
curves in the logarithmic domain for the point 1 and 2, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
Here Counterfeit electronic components (CEC), hidden 
trouble in electronic supply chain, are of great concern to 
governments, industries and defenses globally. They could 
cause catastrophic consequence or failure to critical in-
services system due to its low-quality, low-efficiency or 
unreliability [1, 2]. Typical malfunctions of CECs such as 
overheating or short circuits, leading to fires, shocks or 
explosions that can result in serious injury and property crash 
in manufacturing, transporting and aviation. CECs also pose 
severe threats to cybersecurity, which has been identified as 
one of the most serious economic and national security 
challenges of the 21st century [3]. The legitimate electronic 
industries miss out on about $100 billion of global revenue 
every year because of counterfeiting, which is just one part of 
economic benefit in the murky CEC market [4]. Some 
stakeholders apply a variety of inspection methods to screen 
for counterfeits, but are limited by a combination of 
disadvantages [5]. For example; random spot checks are often 
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time-consuming and can miss detections between inspections 
[6]. Other techniques, similarly, cannot be widely used due to 
features of destructive, low throughput, high unit-cost or 
over-sophisticated for unskilled operator [7]. Therefore, an 
intuitive, non-contact, high-efficient and low-cost non-
destructive inspection technique is urgently demanded to 
reduce threaten of CECs. 
Non-destructive testing (NDT) techniques have been 
widely used and play an important role in structure 
maintenance, degradation-assessment and though-life 
engineering [8-10]. Ranging from visual, eddy current, 
ultrasonic, magnetic particle, radiography to 3D tomography, 
thermography, multiple NDT methods show great 
applicability and competence in manufacturing, aviation, 
military and nuclear power industry. Among diversity of 
inspection methods, infrared thermography (IRT) is a 
powerful and promising technique due to the features of 
rapid, robust, non-contact inspection and intuitive images. 
IRT can be divided into two modes: active and passive. In 
order to rapidly identify counterfeit parts in batches, active 
thermography, which induce a heat flow into objects to 
generate thermal contrast and to highlight anomalies and 
defect, is more competent. Active thermography varies into 
different forms according to diversity of heat source including 
flash [11], laser [12], eddy current [13] and ultrasonic 
vibration. While the heating application differs between 
pulse, lock-in and modulated patterns, according the 
inspection requirement. The aims of this research is to 
develop a rapid, robust and non-destructive inspection 
technique for CECs. A high-energy pulse flash is applied to 
perform the pulse thermography test for electronic 
components. 
In infrared thermography, thermal image processing 
methods are crucial to post-inspection process dealing with 
characteristic signal extraction, defect quantification to image 
quality improvement; for instance, the pulse phase 
thermography (PPT) algorithm [14] was one such method 
based on the phase signal of response of the thermal wave in 
inspected objects. But its capability is commonly limited in 
those cases whose initial decline frames is heavily impacted 
by noises. The Thermographic Signal Reconstruction (TSR) 
[15] method was a milestone algorithm which remarkably 
improved the spatial and temporal resolution of the 
thermogram sequence and consequently promoted the 
anomaly detectability. By focusing on thermal sequence 
reconstruction and alleviating the transient noise 
simultaneously, TSR-based analysis and corresponding 
developments have been applied on quantification of different 
defect information and transformation of the thermography 
data into RGB images [16, 17]. In addition, its theory has been 
extended to use with other algorithms, like Principal 
Component Thermography (PCT) [18]. The elegance of the 
TSR method has been demonstrated to be powerful at 
extracting subtle features in thermography data, which make 
it attractive for use in inspection of electronic components. 
The paper describes the experiment setup and TSR method 
used, detailing application of the TSR “fingerprint” method, 
followed by investigation of signature variation from 
experimental parameters, and between similar and different 
components, establishing a ‘base-line’ for minimum and 
maximum correlation, which is then compared with a real 
counterfeit example component. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Experiment setup 
In pulsed thermography, the experimental setup 
encompasses a short and high energy light pulse is projected 
onto the sample surface via flash lamps, shown in Fig. 1(a). 
Heat then conducts from the surface to the interior of the 
sample, leading to a continuous decrease of the surface 
temperature [1] (see Fig. 1(b)). An infrared camera captures 
the time-dependent response of the surface temperature. The 
time of cooling interruption can be used to estimate thickness 
(if thermal diffusivity is known) or diffusivity (if the 
thickness is known) of the sample material.  
The experiments were conducted using the 
Thermoscope® II pulsed-active thermography system that 
comprises of two capacitor banks powered Xenon flash 
lamps mounted in an internally reflective hood and a desktop 
PC to capture and store data. A FLIR SC7000 series infrared 
(IR) radiometer operating between 3-5.1 µm and a spatial 
resolution of 640×512 pixels was used to perform the 
inspection. The samples were placed with their surface 
perpendicular to the IR camera’s line of sight at 250 mm from 
the lens. The flash energy applied was ~ 2 kJ over an 
inspection area of 250 mm × 200 mm. The pixel pitch is 0.32 
mm. 
Fig2. (a) shows a snapshot of the test board that includes 
various types electronic components. A raw temperature 
thermogram of the test board inspected from the top side from 
the first frame after flash is shown in Fig. 2(b).  
2.2 Estimation of thermal fingerprint 
 
Fig. 1: (a) Experimental configuration of the pulsed thermographic 
inspection, where point 1 denotes a position on the sample surface 
with a reduced thickness and point 2 denotes a position representing 
the through-thickness; (b) Typical observed time-temperature decay 
curves in the logarithmic domain for the point 1 and 2, respectively. 
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The surface temperature due to the back-wall at depth 𝐿𝐿 
for a homogeneous plate is given by [19]: 
 









where 𝑇𝑇(0, 𝑡𝑡) is the temperature variation of the surface at 
time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑄𝑄 is the pulse energy, 𝜋𝜋 is the material density, 𝜋𝜋 is 
the heat capacity, 𝜋𝜋  is the thermal conductivity of the 
material, 𝑅𝑅 is the thermal reflection coefficient of the air gap 
interface, and 𝛼𝛼 is the thermal diffusivity. 
A linear relation in the logarithmic domain with slope -0.5 
as Eq. (2) exists for time and temperature if both sides of Eq. 
(1) are applied by the logarithmic operation [20]. 
 
ln[𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)] = ln [ 𝑄𝑄
√𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
] − 0.5ln⁡(𝑡𝑡) (2) 
 
The temperature response of any change in thermal material 
property from structure, damage or defect will derivate from 
the linear response. Shepard [21] proposed a Thermal Signal 
Reconstruction (TSR) technique to reduce temporal noise 
using a high order polynomial model to fit the temperature 





where 𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)  is the surface temperature at time 𝑡𝑡 , 𝑁𝑁  is the 
model order, and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are coefficients to be estimated. Once the 
unknown coefficients 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖⁡are estimated by the least square 
method, the temperature behaviour can be reconstructed to 
replace the raw data. The first and second derivatives of 
ln[𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)]  with respect to ln(𝑡𝑡)  can be calculated from the 
estimated coefficients directly, expressed as: 
 
𝑑𝑑ln[𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)]











The second derivative of temperature delay TSR fitting is 
used in this paper to construct the fingerprint. Fig. 3(a) plots 
an example for a single pixel on the selected region of 
interest. The first reason is that it is much more sensitive to 
the change of material, dimension or structure of component 
than the raw and first derivative. The byproduct is that it will 
be sensitive to noise as well, but the application of TSR could 
mitigate this potential problem. The second reason is that 
although the excitation heat applied on the surface is 
approximately uniform, there is still a variation of initial 
temperature across different regions. The raw temperature 
delay is not appropriate for pattern comparison directly 
because the initial applied temperature can be different even 
for the same component. The first and second derivatives are 
more appropriate because even the initial temperature is 
different, the change behaviour of temperature should be 
similar for two identical components. The fingerprint 
procedure can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Define the resolution of fingerprint, denoted by 
W x H. 
2. Select the range of time in logarithmic domain 
ln(𝑡𝑡) ∈ [𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚] and estimate the time step 
∆ ln(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊 . 
 
Fig. 2: (a) The test board with various electronic components; (b) A 





Fig. 3: (a) An example of the second derivative of TSR for a single 
pixel; (b) an example of the second derivative fingerprint for a selected 
region (multiple pixels). 
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3. For a pixel on the selected region, estimate the 
model shown in Eq. (3). 
4. Calculate the value of the second derivative using 
Eq. (5) for ln(𝑡𝑡) =
∆ ln(𝑡𝑡) , 2∆ ln(𝑡𝑡) , … ,𝑊𝑊∆ ln(𝑡𝑡)⁡ and update the 
counter for the W x H bins by 1. 
5. Repeat the step 3 and 4 for each pixel on the 
selected region and the fingerprint can be 
represented by the W x H bins. 
6. Visualise the fingerprint, as shown in Fig.3 (b), 
where color represents the number of pixels in 
each bin. 
2.3 Similarity of fingerprint 
To differentiate whether a component is genuine or 
counterfeit, the fingerprint of the inspected component needs 
to be compared with that of the reference component. 
Methods are available to quantify the difference between two 
images, such as Mean Square Error (MSE), Peak Signal to 
Noise Ratio (PSNR) or Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) 
etc. In this paper, the 2nd differential correlation coefficient, 
rab, was employed to measure the similarity between two 
fingerprints:  Fa and Fb, and it can be written as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 
∑ ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹?̅?𝑎)(𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎̅̅̅)𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤=1
√(∑ ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹?̅?𝑎)2𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤=1 )(∑ ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎̅̅̅)2𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤=1 )
 
(6) 
where 𝐹𝐹?̅?𝑎 and 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎̅̅ ̅ are the mean of the fingerprints 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 and 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎. 
The value of 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  is always between 1 and -1. If the two 
fingerprints are similar, the value of 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  is close to 1. 
3. Results 
3.1 Influence of flash power 
The first step was to establish an appropriate flash power 
of the system for the study. Datasets were captured using four 
flash powers for the same part, using quarter values of the 
total flash power available to the system. The temperature 
decay profiles had contrasted origin and end-points, 
indicative of the different amount of heat energy input into 
the sample from the differing flash powers, while that of the 
25% flash produced a weaker signal with a different shape 
compared to the other flash powers used. As can be seen by 
the temperature decay profiles from these tests, the data from 
25% flash power produces a weaker, unreliable signal. The 
unusual shape of the 25% flash signal that is the source of the 
low correlation with the other results is likely to be related to 
poor polynomial fit of a noisier signal that would require 
more careful selection of polynomial fitting parameters to 
suppress it. Further analysis in the form of correlation of the 
2nd differential fingerprints were made, to compare the 
similarity of the different flash powers, given in Table 1. The 
signal between 50-100% flash power exhibited a close 
correlation, indicating that each dataset produced a signal and 
respective fingerprint of similar quality. The full flash power 
was used as standard in further tests. 
3.2 Repeatability for the same part 
In order to gauge the significance of changes between any 
two fingerprints, it was important to assess the inherent 
variability in the data captures of the same component. One 
of the parts was captured on different occasions: two captures 
occurring hours apart, with other captures occurring between 
them, and one on a different day. This was to capture the 
inherent variability of the flash test in the data capture, and to 
measure the repeatability between the tests as a benchmark 
for the level of variation that can be expected. The correlation 
of the 2nd derivative fingerprints from these tests are shown 
in Table 2. The correlations between these repeat captures are 
high, which provides confidence in the repeatability between 
the captures and gives an early indication that any identified 
signatures could be reliably exploited. It should be noted that 
the correlation provided is a direct comparison of the 2nd 
derivative fingerprints, and only measure the gross variation 
between the captures. Making the assumption that four 
components on the board of the same type are identical; they 
are compared within the same capture providing a measure 
of variation within the same component in the same capture; 
suppressing the variability between captures, focusing on 
variation in the part, only. The correlations for these parts are 
shown in Table 3.  
The strong correlations between the thermal signatures of 
these parts indicate that the four parts appear to have little 
Table 1. Cross-correlation analysis of fingerprint profiles from data 
captures of the same part taken at different flash heating powers. 
 25% 50% 75% 100% 
25%  0.12 0.11 0.12 
50% 0.12  0.92 0.92 
75% 0.11 0.92  0.93 
100% 0.12 0.92 0.93  
 
 
Table 2. Cross-correlation between the fingerprints of 3 captures 
of the same part using the same parameters (part: W05)  
 Test1 Test2 Test3 
Test1  0.90 0.89 
Test2 0.90  0.90 
Test3 0.89 0.90  
 
 
Table 3. Cross-correlation of fingerprints: similar parts W01-W04 
 W01 W02 W03 W04 
W01  0.95 0.96 0.95 
W02 0.95  0.96 0.95 
W03 0.96 0.96  0.95 
W04 0.95 0.95 0.95  
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The surface temperature due to the back-wall at depth 𝐿𝐿 
for a homogeneous plate is given by [19]: 
 









where 𝑇𝑇(0, 𝑡𝑡) is the temperature variation of the surface at 
time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑄𝑄 is the pulse energy, 𝜋𝜋 is the material density, 𝜋𝜋 is 
the heat capacity, 𝜋𝜋  is the thermal conductivity of the 
material, 𝑅𝑅 is the thermal reflection coefficient of the air gap 
interface, and 𝛼𝛼 is the thermal diffusivity. 
A linear relation in the logarithmic domain with slope -0.5 
as Eq. (2) exists for time and temperature if both sides of Eq. 
(1) are applied by the logarithmic operation [20]. 
 
ln[𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)] = ln [ 𝑄𝑄
√𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
] − 0.5ln⁡(𝑡𝑡) (2) 
 
The temperature response of any change in thermal material 
property from structure, damage or defect will derivate from 
the linear response. Shepard [21] proposed a Thermal Signal 
Reconstruction (TSR) technique to reduce temporal noise 
using a high order polynomial model to fit the temperature 





where 𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)  is the surface temperature at time 𝑡𝑡 , 𝑁𝑁  is the 
model order, and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are coefficients to be estimated. Once the 
unknown coefficients 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖⁡are estimated by the least square 
method, the temperature behaviour can be reconstructed to 
replace the raw data. The first and second derivatives of 
ln[𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)]  with respect to ln(𝑡𝑡)  can be calculated from the 
estimated coefficients directly, expressed as: 
 
𝑑𝑑ln[𝑇𝑇(𝑡𝑡)]











The second derivative of temperature delay TSR fitting is 
used in this paper to construct the fingerprint. Fig. 3(a) plots 
an example for a single pixel on the selected region of 
interest. The first reason is that it is much more sensitive to 
the change of material, dimension or structure of component 
than the raw and first derivative. The byproduct is that it will 
be sensitive to noise as well, but the application of TSR could 
mitigate this potential problem. The second reason is that 
although the excitation heat applied on the surface is 
approximately uniform, there is still a variation of initial 
temperature across different regions. The raw temperature 
delay is not appropriate for pattern comparison directly 
because the initial applied temperature can be different even 
for the same component. The first and second derivatives are 
more appropriate because even the initial temperature is 
different, the change behaviour of temperature should be 
similar for two identical components. The fingerprint 
procedure can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Define the resolution of fingerprint, denoted by 
W x H. 
2. Select the range of time in logarithmic domain 
ln(𝑡𝑡) ∈ [𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚] and estimate the time step 
∆ ln(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊 . 
 
Fig. 2: (a) The test board with various electronic components; (b) A 





Fig. 3: (a) An example of the second derivative of TSR for a single 
pixel; (b) an example of the second derivative fingerprint for a selected 
region (multiple pixels). 
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3. For a pixel on the selected region, estimate the 
model shown in Eq. (3). 
4. Calculate the value of the second derivative using 
Eq. (5) for ln(𝑡𝑡) =
∆ ln(𝑡𝑡) , 2∆ ln(𝑡𝑡) , … ,𝑊𝑊∆ ln(𝑡𝑡)⁡ and update the 
counter for the W x H bins by 1. 
5. Repeat the step 3 and 4 for each pixel on the 
selected region and the fingerprint can be 
represented by the W x H bins. 
6. Visualise the fingerprint, as shown in Fig.3 (b), 
where color represents the number of pixels in 
each bin. 
2.3 Similarity of fingerprint 
To differentiate whether a component is genuine or 
counterfeit, the fingerprint of the inspected component needs 
to be compared with that of the reference component. 
Methods are available to quantify the difference between two 
images, such as Mean Square Error (MSE), Peak Signal to 
Noise Ratio (PSNR) or Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) 
etc. In this paper, the 2nd differential correlation coefficient, 
rab, was employed to measure the similarity between two 
fingerprints:  Fa and Fb, and it can be written as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 
∑ ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹?̅?𝑎)(𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎̅̅̅)𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤=1
√(∑ ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹?̅?𝑎)2𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤=1 )(∑ ∑ (𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎(𝑤𝑤, ℎ) − 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎̅̅̅)2𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤=1 )
 
(6) 
where 𝐹𝐹?̅?𝑎 and 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎̅̅ ̅ are the mean of the fingerprints 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 and 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎. 
The value of 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  is always between 1 and -1. If the two 
fingerprints are similar, the value of 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  is close to 1. 
3. Results 
3.1 Influence of flash power 
The first step was to establish an appropriate flash power 
of the system for the study. Datasets were captured using four 
flash powers for the same part, using quarter values of the 
total flash power available to the system. The temperature 
decay profiles had contrasted origin and end-points, 
indicative of the different amount of heat energy input into 
the sample from the differing flash powers, while that of the 
25% flash produced a weaker signal with a different shape 
compared to the other flash powers used. As can be seen by 
the temperature decay profiles from these tests, the data from 
25% flash power produces a weaker, unreliable signal. The 
unusual shape of the 25% flash signal that is the source of the 
low correlation with the other results is likely to be related to 
poor polynomial fit of a noisier signal that would require 
more careful selection of polynomial fitting parameters to 
suppress it. Further analysis in the form of correlation of the 
2nd differential fingerprints were made, to compare the 
similarity of the different flash powers, given in Table 1. The 
signal between 50-100% flash power exhibited a close 
correlation, indicating that each dataset produced a signal and 
respective fingerprint of similar quality. The full flash power 
was used as standard in further tests. 
3.2 Repeatability for the same part 
In order to gauge the significance of changes between any 
two fingerprints, it was important to assess the inherent 
variability in the data captures of the same component. One 
of the parts was captured on different occasions: two captures 
occurring hours apart, with other captures occurring between 
them, and one on a different day. This was to capture the 
inherent variability of the flash test in the data capture, and to 
measure the repeatability between the tests as a benchmark 
for the level of variation that can be expected. The correlation 
of the 2nd derivative fingerprints from these tests are shown 
in Table 2. The correlations between these repeat captures are 
high, which provides confidence in the repeatability between 
the captures and gives an early indication that any identified 
signatures could be reliably exploited. It should be noted that 
the correlation provided is a direct comparison of the 2nd 
derivative fingerprints, and only measure the gross variation 
between the captures. Making the assumption that four 
components on the board of the same type are identical; they 
are compared within the same capture providing a measure 
of variation within the same component in the same capture; 
suppressing the variability between captures, focusing on 
variation in the part, only. The correlations for these parts are 
shown in Table 3.  
The strong correlations between the thermal signatures of 
these parts indicate that the four parts appear to have little 
Table 1. Cross-correlation analysis of fingerprint profiles from data 
captures of the same part taken at different flash heating powers. 
 25% 50% 75% 100% 
25%  0.12 0.11 0.12 
50% 0.12  0.92 0.92 
75% 0.11 0.92  0.93 
100% 0.12 0.92 0.93  
 
 
Table 2. Cross-correlation between the fingerprints of 3 captures 
of the same part using the same parameters (part: W05)  
 Test1 Test2 Test3 
Test1  0.90 0.89 
Test2 0.90  0.90 
Test3 0.89 0.90  
 
 
Table 3. Cross-correlation of fingerprints: similar parts W01-W04 
 W01 W02 W03 W04 
W01  0.95 0.96 0.95 
W02 0.95  0.96 0.95 
W03 0.96 0.96  0.95 
W04 0.95 0.95 0.95  
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differences between them, and, in comparison with the 
correlations in Table 2, where a different part was compared 
with multiple captures of itself, these differences indicate that 
there is likely to be a stronger variation between captures than 
there may be between parts, and that that features of the 
fingerprints, than just comparisons of the raw fingerprints. If 
any of the modules are counterfeit examples, their signals are 
more strongly correlated than a different part compares with 
other captures of itself; while this is not sufficient to conclude 
the modules are genuine, it at least strongly indicates that 
there is little difference between the four modules on the 
board. Further repeat captures were performed rotating the 
board by 90 degrees, and translating the component on the 
left, and the right of the field of view, in order to capture 
variation from the part’s location in the field of view. The 
correlations between these are shown in Table 4. 
The correlation factors for these are similar, but slightly 
lower than the repeat-captures of the same part (W05) 
presented in Table 2. This indicates that the location of the 
part within the field of view has a factor on the measured 
signal, and further highlights the importance of searching for 
features of the thermal signature to exploit, than simple 
comparisons of the part’s signature as-measured. 
3.3 Comparison of different parts 
Enlightened by the comparisons of the same parts with 
repeat captures of themselves, and with comparisons of their 
twin parts of the same part model, the signatures of 
completely different parts were also compared; the 
correlations of these different components are provided in 
Table 5. As expected, the different parts exhibit measurably 
different signatures, providing much stronger differences in 
their correlations than demonstrated in the previous 
examples. This strong difference from different parts 
highlights thermography’s capability for identification of 
parts using their internal material properties. Table 5 shows 
different parts, with ‘same part’ pairs, W07-W08, W09-W10, 
and W11, W12, which resulted in correlation coefficients of 
0.84, 0.82, and 0.61, respectively. The W11-W12 matched 
pair were known to contain a suspect counterfeit part, 
confirmed by x-ray micrograph, as shown in Fig. 4. The 
fingerprint correlation coefficient between the counterfeit 
‘same part’ pair, W11-W12 were higher than those produced 
by comparing the signatures of different parts, but lower than 
the repeat captures correlations of same parts, and were also 
Table 4. Cross-correlation between fingerprints of the same part, 
W05 captured at two orientations perpendicular to each other, with 
the rotations also translated to the left and right of the field of view 
 Normal 90o, left 90 o, right 
Normal  0.88 0.83 
90 o, left 0.88  0.90 




Fig. 4: (a) Visual inspection of parts W11 & W12; (b) x-ray inspection 
of W11 & W12, showing differences in internal wiring 
 
Fig. 5: Illustration of possible part condition categorisation boundaries, 
based on the proposed use of fingerprint analysis 
Table 5. Cross-correlation analysis of the fingerprints of different components with two matching pairs, one containing a counterfeit 
 W01 W05 W07 W09 W13 W08 W10 W11 W12 
W01  0.21 0.41 0.34 0.17 0.35 0.26 0.12 0.09 
W05 0.21  0.51 0.24 0.40 0.59 0.24 0.32 0.34 
W07 0.41 0.51  0.52 0.36 0.84 0.48 0.23 0.25 
W09 0.34 0.24 0.52  0.12 0.43 0.82 0.10 0.08 
W13 0.17 0.40 0.36 0.12  0.36 0.12 0.39 0.49 
W08 0.35 0.59 0.84 0.43 0.36  0.41 0.23 0.27 
W10 0.26 0.24 0.48 0.82 0.12 0.41  0.10 0.09 
W11 0.12 0.32 0.23 0.10 0.39 0.23 0.10  0.61 
W12 0.09 0.34 0.25 0.08 0.49 0.27 0.09 0.61  
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lower than the correlations of same ‘part pairs’. This result 
indicates that the TSR Fingerprint signature of a counterfeit 
part can be detectable with a rapid pulsed thermographic 
NDT inspection. The differences between the correlation 
coefficients for the different sample populations indicates 
that they could be used to produce classification boundaries 
based on their signature correlations, a sketch of which, based 
on these findings is shown in Fig. 5. It is expected that 
different parts and counterfeit types would exhibit different 
classification bands, which would require a large volume of 
part signatures to begin populating a usable classification 
database, which could be deployed on a user end system, 
implemented on a factory floor prior to the manufacture 
stage. The method could enhance detection screening for 
counterfeit proliferation, however its suitability would be 
limited to counterfeit methods which incur a change in 
thermal properties orientated normal to the surface. 
4. Conclusions 
The paper has demonstrated that pulsed thermography can 
be deployed to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit 
electronic components. The similarity of the proposed 
thermal fingerprint for the same part under different test 
environment, rotation angles is more than 0.8. The similarity 
of fingerprint of different parts is usually less than 0.5, 
suggesting that the TSR fingerprint has the potential to act a 
thermal-marker for detection of counterfeit electronic 
components. The ability of a counterfeit parts to produce a 
measurable difference in its thermographic signature would 
depend on the nature of the counterfeit of the part and its 
physical change of the part with respect to a genuine part, 
which would require further research with a larger volume 
with counterfeit components, to reinforce these findings. 
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differences between them, and, in comparison with the 
correlations in Table 2, where a different part was compared 
with multiple captures of itself, these differences indicate that 
there is likely to be a stronger variation between captures than 
there may be between parts, and that that features of the 
fingerprints, than just comparisons of the raw fingerprints. If 
any of the modules are counterfeit examples, their signals are 
more strongly correlated than a different part compares with 
other captures of itself; while this is not sufficient to conclude 
the modules are genuine, it at least strongly indicates that 
there is little difference between the four modules on the 
board. Further repeat captures were performed rotating the 
board by 90 degrees, and translating the component on the 
left, and the right of the field of view, in order to capture 
variation from the part’s location in the field of view. The 
correlations between these are shown in Table 4. 
The correlation factors for these are similar, but slightly 
lower than the repeat-captures of the same part (W05) 
presented in Table 2. This indicates that the location of the 
part within the field of view has a factor on the measured 
signal, and further highlights the importance of searching for 
features of the thermal signature to exploit, than simple 
comparisons of the part’s signature as-measured. 
3.3 Comparison of different parts 
Enlightened by the comparisons of the same parts with 
repeat captures of themselves, and with comparisons of their 
twin parts of the same part model, the signatures of 
completely different parts were also compared; the 
correlations of these different components are provided in 
Table 5. As expected, the different parts exhibit measurably 
different signatures, providing much stronger differences in 
their correlations than demonstrated in the previous 
examples. This strong difference from different parts 
highlights thermography’s capability for identification of 
parts using their internal material properties. Table 5 shows 
different parts, with ‘same part’ pairs, W07-W08, W09-W10, 
and W11, W12, which resulted in correlation coefficients of 
0.84, 0.82, and 0.61, respectively. The W11-W12 matched 
pair were known to contain a suspect counterfeit part, 
confirmed by x-ray micrograph, as shown in Fig. 4. The 
fingerprint correlation coefficient between the counterfeit 
‘same part’ pair, W11-W12 were higher than those produced 
by comparing the signatures of different parts, but lower than 
the repeat captures correlations of same parts, and were also 
Table 4. Cross-correlation between fingerprints of the same part, 
W05 captured at two orientations perpendicular to each other, with 
the rotations also translated to the left and right of the field of view 
 Normal 90o, left 90 o, right 
Normal  0.88 0.83 
90 o, left 0.88  0.90 




Fig. 4: (a) Visual inspection of parts W11 & W12; (b) x-ray inspection 
of W11 & W12, showing differences in internal wiring 
 
Fig. 5: Illustration of possible part condition categorisation boundaries, 
based on the proposed use of fingerprint analysis 
Table 5. Cross-correlation analysis of the fingerprints of different components with two matching pairs, one containing a counterfeit 
 W01 W05 W07 W09 W13 W08 W10 W11 W12 
W01  0.21 0.41 0.34 0.17 0.35 0.26 0.12 0.09 
W05 0.21  0.51 0.24 0.40 0.59 0.24 0.32 0.34 
W07 0.41 0.51  0.52 0.36 0.84 0.48 0.23 0.25 
W09 0.34 0.24 0.52  0.12 0.43 0.82 0.10 0.08 
W13 0.17 0.40 0.36 0.12  0.36 0.12 0.39 0.49 
W08 0.35 0.59 0.84 0.43 0.36  0.41 0.23 0.27 
W10 0.26 0.24 0.48 0.82 0.12 0.41  0.10 0.09 
W11 0.12 0.32 0.23 0.10 0.39 0.23 0.10  0.61 
W12 0.09 0.34 0.25 0.08 0.49 0.27 0.09 0.61  
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lower than the correlations of same ‘part pairs’. This result 
indicates that the TSR Fingerprint signature of a counterfeit 
part can be detectable with a rapid pulsed thermographic 
NDT inspection. The differences between the correlation 
coefficients for the different sample populations indicates 
that they could be used to produce classification boundaries 
based on their signature correlations, a sketch of which, based 
on these findings is shown in Fig. 5. It is expected that 
different parts and counterfeit types would exhibit different 
classification bands, which would require a large volume of 
part signatures to begin populating a usable classification 
database, which could be deployed on a user end system, 
implemented on a factory floor prior to the manufacture 
stage. The method could enhance detection screening for 
counterfeit proliferation, however its suitability would be 
limited to counterfeit methods which incur a change in 
thermal properties orientated normal to the surface. 
4. Conclusions 
The paper has demonstrated that pulsed thermography can 
be deployed to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit 
electronic components. The similarity of the proposed 
thermal fingerprint for the same part under different test 
environment, rotation angles is more than 0.8. The similarity 
of fingerprint of different parts is usually less than 0.5, 
suggesting that the TSR fingerprint has the potential to act a 
thermal-marker for detection of counterfeit electronic 
components. The ability of a counterfeit parts to produce a 
measurable difference in its thermographic signature would 
depend on the nature of the counterfeit of the part and its 
physical change of the part with respect to a genuine part, 
which would require further research with a larger volume 
with counterfeit components, to reinforce these findings. 
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